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Pandorafs Tongues 
Karin Littau 
In After Babel George Steiner recounts "two main conjectures" in 
mythology which explain "the mystery of many tongues on which a view 
of translation hinges". One such mythic tale is the tower of Babel, which 
not only Steiner, but also Jacques Derrida1 after him, take as their starting 
point to approach the question of translation; the other conjecture tells of 
"some awful error [which] was committed, an accidental release of 
linguistic chaos, in the mode of Pandora's Box" (Steiner 1975, p. 57). This 
paper will take this other conjecture, the myth of Pandora, first woman of 
the Greek creation myth, as its point of departure, not only to offer a 
feminized version of the primal scattering of languages, but to rewrite in 
a positive light and therefore also reverse the negative and misogynist 
association of Pandora with man's fall. 
I will therefore draw on recent feminist debates on the 
reappropriations of myth, and in this instance, use the figure of Pandora 
to combine aspects both of the Babel myth and the Oedipus myth. This is 
because, whilst Babel is associated with loss, the loss of one tongue, and 
Oedipus is associated with lack, man's castration anxiety, Pandora's box 
has been associated with both: the threat of linguistic chaos, i.e. the loss 
of understanding, and the threat of woman's sexuality, i.e. woman's lack 
of genitals. The Pandora myth, in other words, embodies phallocentric 
anxieties of Woman, both as regards language — the mother tongue, and 
1
 As Derrida puts it in The Ear of the Other. "I chose the example of Babel 
because I think it can provide an epigraph for all discussions of translation" 
(1985b, p. 100). Or as he puts it rather succinctly later on in the discussion, 
"[t]here is Babel everywhere" (p. 149). 
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as regards her gender — female sexuality. But, rather than exposing the 
entrenched patriarchal bias in mythographers' interpretations of Pandora, 
my foremost aim is to pose through her figure questions about language 
and woman, and by extension, the mother tongue and female sexuality. 
Whilst the myth of the tower of Babel makes visible the filiations of 
translation and the word of the Father, the myth of Pandora allows us to 
uncover the matrix between translation and the mother tongue, presents 
us, in other words, with new possibilities for translation and gender. 
Babel, of course, marks the multiplicity of languages imposed on 
the sons of Noah by God, as his punishment for man imitating the divine 
Ursprache by which word and world come simultaneously into being, as 
his revenge on man for making a name for himself. Babel also designates 
the name of the city of this second fall, names confusion, and is a 
composite name, Ba referring to father, and Bel to God. The gift of 
language which God had given to man he takes back; as Derrida shows 
in "Des Tours de Babel", he, Ba-Bel, the god as father "poisons the 
present", adds Gift to the gift (1985a, p. 167)2. What was the Adamic 
tongue now became mankind's many tongues, so that men would no 
longer communicate and understand each other with ease. Babel, as the 
proper name of a city, the common name for God the father, his patronym 
for this city, or more generally the synonym for confusion, thus unfolds 
all the different threads of its filiations, and poses for Derrida therefore the 
basic law of undecidability: "the impossibility of deciding whether this 
name belongs, properly and simply, to one tongue" (1985a, p. 174). 
The myth of the Urweib Pandora also tells of a Gift-gin 
(poison/present) she brings to mankind. But before unwrapping Pandora's 
box, it is necessary to add a few words about Pandora's name, which 
similarly plays upon an excess of significations. For, in Hesiod, it 
becomes clear that Pan-dora, gift-giver, signals in one name, and in one 
language, three meanings upon which he deliberately plays: "she is the 
giver of all gifts", "she who was given all gifts", "the gift of all the gods" 
(see Hurwit 1995, p. 176). What remains to be seen, however, is the 
precise nature of her gift, the contents of the box which she opens. For, 
2
 The difference in meaning between the German word Gift, which is "poison", 
and the English gift, also of course echoes the term pharmakon, translatable from 
the Greek as both "poison" and "cure", a double translatability which I will return 
to later. 
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whether it was Pandora who opened the box, or Epimetheus who opened 
it, or whether Pandora's box, if there ever was such a container, was a 
cornucopoeia, or apithos ("immovable storage jar"), or a pyxis ("small 
portable vessel"), or whether we should blame Erasmus of Rotterdam for 
his translation of pithos into pyxis, and for his translation's grammatical 
ambiguity which seems to suggest that it was the man, he, Epimetheus, 
being the subject of the sentence, who opened the box, and not Pandora 
(Panofsky 1962, p. 17) — all these versions constitute instances of the 
tale's history of textual transmissions of which translation itself decided 
the content of the myth, that is, decided both the nature of the box, and the 
gender of who opened it. Moreover, not only the nature but also the 
contents of the box point to two very different tales of the myth. 
In one such tale, following the non-Hesiodic tradition of the 
myth, Pandora is Gaia, Mother Earth, the first woman, and wife to 
Prometheus, who created her out of water and earth and brought her to 
life with fire. Here, her container is a horn of plenty which contains all the 
provisions to feed mankind, and as such connotes fertility. The Pandora 
of Hesiod's tale, on the other hand, is created by Zeus to avenge the gods 
and punish Prometheus' theft of fire from them. When Pandora opens her 
box out of curiosity, all the ills of the world are released. When the lid 
falls shut, only hope remains at the bottom of the box. In this account, 
Pandora is a femme fatale whose beauty, charms and seductiveness 
ultimately bring about his downfall; and here, her box represents nothing 
other than the female body, the threats and allures of her sexuality. In a 
Freudian reading then, the box as an image of concealment as well as 
mystery, generates a metaphoric relation to the female genitals, which, 
unlike the phallus, remain hidden and invisible, conceal a secret 
dangerous to man. Her box in this sense does not so much contain gifts to 
mankind, but is Gift to him, hope remaining trapped in the box, and 
unavailable to mankind. Whilst Steiner clearly interprets Pandora's 
unleashing of "linguistic chaos" negatively (as Gift), T. Gantz, on the 
contrary, has it "that elpis should mean not 'hope' but 'expectation' or 
'awareness', so that men would be denied the full knowledge of their sorry 
condition: trapping elpis in the jar, then would be a gift after all" (quoted 
in Hurwit 1995, p. 184). Once more then, in the myth's twists and turns, 
Pandora and her box appear in contradictory ways, which is why myth 
"cannot be grasped or encompassed; it haunts human consciousness 
without ever appearing before it in fixed form" (de Beauvoir 1972, p. 
175). Female figures in mythology are "contradictory", and Pandora is 
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"various", precisely because she is a principle of projection: "Delilah and 
Judith, Aspasia and Lucretia, Pandora and Athena — woman is at once 
Eve and the Virgin Mary. She is idol, a servant, the source of life, a power 
of darkness", from which de Beauvoir concludes that "she is everything 
that he is not and that he longs for"3. 
The Pandora myth therefore tells (at least) two stories, or we 
might say, speaks in (at least) two tongues. Pandora brings hope and/or 
ills; she brings remedy and/or poison to mankind; in short, when she 
opens her container, she unleashes the pharmakon. Thus, not unlike 
Plato's doubly translatable term pharmakon (writing as poison, and/or as 
remedy), which, as Derrida shows, came to be inscribed differently by its 
translators in the tradition of philosophy (sometimes as poison, other 
times as remedy), so, the seemingly fork-tongued Pandora has come to be 
inscribed differently by her mythographers (sometimes as hope for 
mankind, other times as his ills). For us, therefore, Pandora poses the 
question of translation, as the pharmakon does for Derrida4, not merely 
"in the passage from one language to another", but also "in the tradition 
between Greek and Greek" (1981, p. 72); a point which Derrida 
encapsulates in the phrase "plus d'une langue — more than one language, 
no more of one" (1986, p. 15). The plurality of languages within what is 
no longer one suggests that translation is always already operative within 
the same language, which is why "[t]here is impurity in every language" 
and why "[t]his fact would in some way have to threaten every linguistic 
system's integrity", that is, undermine the very presumption of "the 
existence of one language and of one translation in the literal sense" 
3
 See also Littau 1995 for an expanded version of this argument, illustrated with 
reference to the many projections of Wedekind's Lulu-figure from his plays Earth 
Spirit and Pandora's Box in subsequent adaptations, translations and rewrites. 
4
 Note also the myth of Medea — the foreigner from Colchis, who later turns into 
a nomad — the (in)famous sorceress whose pharmaka (herbs and magic potions) 
are used by her both to heal and to poison. While her herbs in effect save Jason 
from sure death in his quest to obtain the Golden Fleece, or rejuvenate Jason's frail 
father, her magical concoctions later on in Ovid's version of the tale in 
Metamorphoses, not only kill Jason's father's brother, Pelius, but also poison 
Jason's new bride. Space does not allow here to follow through the twists and 
turns of the Medea myth, suffice to say, if Pandora's box unleashes the 
pharmakon, Medea's box of magic potions (like Pandora, she is also often 
depicted pictorially carrying a box) unleashes pharmaka, cures and ills. 
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(1985b, p. 100). The catch-phrase "plus d'une langue" therefore marks the 
irreducible multivocality which inhabits "one" language and all languages, 
performing in effect the resistance to the concept of a univocal translation 
and to translatability as such; it also connects inextricably translation and 
deconstruction. As Peggy Kamuf puts it, Derrida pushes us to "the almost 
unthinkable notion of an originary translation before the possibility of any 
distinction between original and translation" (1991, p. 242). 
It is in this sense also, that Derrida's enterprise illustrates, 
according to Barbara Johnson, that "[l]anguage, in fact, can only exist in 
the space of its own foreignness to itself (1985, p. 146). Since, she 
further points out, "Western philosophy has had as its aim to repress that 
foreignness" (p. 146-147), thus insisting on sameness, while repressing all 
that which threatens sameness, of philosophy to itself, of the West to the 
West, of man to man, we might extend this argument to include also the 
repression ofthat which is foreign to man, that which is other to man: 
woman. Moreover, since the repression of differences between entities (be 
it original and translation, or man and woman) are as Johnson has it, 
"based on a repression of difference within entities, ways in which an 
entity differs from itself (1980, p. x) we might boldly state that it has 
always been the aim of Western philosophy to obliterate this foreignness 
or otherness in (the quest for) the return of the same or, in short, what 
Luce Irigaray has called "hom(me)ology" (1985a, p. 134), the return of 
the same (homo) as the return to man (homme); a concept we will return 
to later. The pharmakon then, speaking two languages in one language, 
is foreign to itself, is "not [...] identical to itself (Derrida 1985a, p. 188), 
and like the German Aufhebung (conservation or suppression) of which 
Derrida says that its "double signification cannot be translated by a single 
word into other languages" (1985b, p. 130), it illustrates that "translation 
[is] both necessary and impossible" (1985a, p. 174). What makes 
translation necessary is the duplicity of given words; what makes it an 
impossible enterprise is that this will involve "an essential loss", as 
Derrida states with reference to the pharmakon, it is its "undecidability 
[which] is going to be lost" (1985b, p. 120) in the translation. 
At this juncture we might wish to hesitate, and look at the 
question of loss and undecidability not from the perspective of Babel, the 
"male god" (Derrida: 1985b, p. 152), but from the perspective of Pandora, 
the first woman, take a feminist track rather than a deconstructive one, to 
pose another scenario: would it not be true to say that there are not just 
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two stories of Pandora, but that the very undecidability between these two 
stories — Pandora as gift or Gift to mankind — makes a third one? This 
by no means implies a Hegelian Aufhebung in the sense that this third 
story (the story of her undecidability) is an amalgam or synthesis of the 
other two stories, nor does it imply a deconstructive untranslatability 
rehearsed once more in the undecidability of the term Aufhebung (as the 
"conservation" of one story, or the "suppression" of the other), but it does 
indicate that the impossibility of deciding between one or the other of her 
stories is indeed a third story, which is why it makes perhaps more sense 
to speak of an excess here rather than a loss: undecidability then is not 
conceived in terms of a loss, but a potentially unstoppable gain. For, 
undecidability is only going to be lost if we were to operate from the 
assumption, as Derrida does, that the original cannot be transported intact 
(in all its multiplicity and undecidability) into the new language; if 
however, we were to be less concerned with the relation between an 
original and its translation, that is to say, if we did not see the translation 
process restricted to the relation between original and translation as a 
binary relation, the relation between two poles, between the same and the 
different, but as a process whereby the original will continue to engender 
more than one version, then nothing is going to be lost in the series of 
endless versions that are always possible. 
This serial nature of the translation process (original and version 
and another version and yet another) rather than the binary orbit (an 
original and its translation) — even if this binary comes to be 
deconstructed, a point we shall turn to later — will be our starting point 
to suggest not a tale of mourning ("What is being told in this biblical récit 
is not transportable into another tongue without an essential loss" [1985b, 
p. 100]), but a joyous affirmation that what Pandora's myth tells us is 
transportable again and again, for here, difference is inconceivable 
without repetition, after all, repetition without difference would not be 
repetition. In short, what informs the difference that Pandora can make, 
is the Deleuzian difference implicit in "the logic of the and" (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1988, p. 25) rather than the Derridean differ anee (see 1982, pp. 
1-27) as the suspension of difference, the deferral or undecidability 
between merely two poles. 
If Babel recounts a difference within the father's tongue even 
before the very im/possibility of translation, Pandora's mother tongue is 
not just simply a forked tongue, as if her language were marked by an 
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internal division or a splitting apart, but she is already multi-lingual. This 
difference in emphasis is crucial and must be unfolded further. Since, 
Babel as a proper name, which is "divided, bifid, ambivalent, polysémie" 
(1985a, p. 170), marks a division not just in God's name, but also a 
"division of God", "insofar as it divides God himself (1985b, p. 102), this 
would suggest that his name, which also stands for linguistic confusion, 
comes to name what is irreducible in language. However, rather than 
arguing that the word Babel, his Word, or any other word is "divided", 
which at least numerically, would seem to involve the possibility of a 
process of reduction (after all, two divided by two makes one); and, rather 
than arguing that language is "bifid" which would seem to indicate that 
something is split into two, from presumably what was one; or for that 
matter, arguing that language is marked by "ambivalente]" which might 
gesture towards two things being of equal, that is, of the same (ambi) 
value; I would wish to play one of Derrida's words off against the others: 
"polysémie", unlike "divided" or "bifid" or "ambivalent", is a term which 
escapes the reduction from the two towards the one, and the consequent 
rise of loss or mourning; "polysémie" moves instead towards production. 
This is to say, Pandora's name and her tongue — the mother tongue — is 
not so much divided from within, but must already be seen as multiplied. 
The many translations of Pandora's name engender her many different 
tales, and illustrate not a lack at the source, but an excess which is played 
out with each and every rendition. 
This brings us then to another aspect of Derrida's thinking on 
translation. When he writes that "the structure of the original is marked by 
the requirement to be translated" (1985a, p. 184), he qualifies this point 
further when he states that "the original [...] begins by lacking and by 
pleading for translation" (p. 184), and provides the following reason: "if 
the original calls for a complement, it is because at the origin it was not 
there without fault, full, complete, total, identical to itself (p. 188), which 
is also why "[t]he translation will truly be a moment in the growth of the 
original, which will complete itself/« enlarging itself (p. 188). Derrida 
reminds us however that "[a]s this growth comes also to complete [...] it 
does not reproduce: it adjoins in adding" (p. 189). As such, translation 
clearly operates according to the logic of the supplément which enacts a 
double movement of addition and substitution. The supplément, Derrida 
writes in Of Grammatology, "adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude 
enriching another plenitude...". On the other hand, it "adds only to 
replace. It intervenes itself in-the-place-of. if it fills, it is as if one fills a 
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void" (1976, pp. 144-145). The translation, which in effect exposes this 
void, thereby "reveals also a potentially infinite series of future 
translations providing further supplementations"5. Although this argument 
appears radical if we consider, as is traditionally held, that it is the original 
which is characterized by richness or plenitude, whilst the translation 
tends to be regarded as an impoverished version of it, apparently lacking 
this richness, and that Derrida begins to deconstruct this hierarchy by 
posing the original in terms of lack, we might wish to consider what this 
claim might imply. The notion of equivalence in traditional Translation 
Studies has, of course, called for an equivalent plenitude on both sides of 
the relation, while the logic of the supplément now makes a 
counter-assumption, denying plenitude to either original or translation. In 
order to assess whether this latter move is really as groundbreaking for 
translation as it first appears, let us consider Derrida's perspective from 
Pandora's point of view. What would it imply for Pandora to say that she 
was "not there without fault, full, complete, total, identical to itself 
(Derrida 1985a, p. 188)? To pose Pandora and her tongue as incomplete, 
"pleading for translation", would this argument not run the risk of inviting 
endless future supplementations of what might contribute to Pandora's 
growth? To impose on Pandora a lack of identity, or posit her as an empty 
screen, would this not also invite endless male projections of what he 
wants her to be, what he longs for in her? Moreover, not only the original, 
but by extension the language of the original — the mother tongue — 
would have to be seen as lacking something, and therefore be in need of 
something extra. 
What then might Pandora be seen to be lacking? Both the 
Urweib and the mother tongue would fall within the purview of a 
Freudian description of woman, whereby woman, measured against his 
possession of the phallus, is lack. What underlies this thesis is that there 
is only one true sex, which is male, a thesis which Luce Irigaray (1977, 
pp. 64-65) rewrites when she proposes that the female sex should no 
longer be conceived as lack, as a wound, or a black hole or "dark 
continent", but as the embrace of "two lips" by two more, and two more 
again (the lips that speak and the vaginal lips that touch). Following 
Irigaray's line of argument, rather than Derrida's then, we can say that 
51 am rephrasing Marvin Carlson's (1985, p. 10) words here, who is making this 
point vis-à-vis the relation between text and performance. 
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Pandora, as Urweib, is not just the bearer of more than one image, she is 
also already the speaker of more than one tongue. Here then, translation 
is not so much the result of Jehova's wrath after man built the tower of 
Babel, but Pandora's gift before man. In other words, Pandora speaks with 
"two lips", and since originary translation is at the tip of the Urweib 
Pandora's tongue, then the Ursprache, the mother tongue, was more than 
one from the beginning (not a question then of a watershed before and 
after Babel). Pandora then is the epitome of this sex which is not one, as 
Irigaray puts it: 
[...] a single word cannot be pronounced, produced, uttered by our 
mouths. Between our lips, yours and mine, several voices, several ways 
of speaking resound endlessly, back and forth. One is never separable 
from the other. You/I: we are always already several at once. (1985b, 
p. 209) 
The multiplicity which characterizes woman in Irigaray's discourse 
extends to both woman's body and woman's speech. In Irigaray, woman 
is neither lack (which would be tantamount to saying that she has no 
voice), nor is she pure plenitude (which would be tantamount to saying 
that the presence of her voice immediately gives us an understanding of 
what she means and therefore what she is). This is why, Pandora in our 
tale, is not a void; she does not lack, nor is she whole, but she transports 
excess, becoming an excess of transport, even sometimes subject to 
excessive transports. The parallel then between the discourses of Derrida 
and Irigaray becomes exponentially divergent at this point. For, to 
inscribe a lack in the mother tongue, to inscribe lack in woman, is to open 
up Pandora's box, not to unleash excess, but only to fill it with endless 
further supplementations. In our tale then, Pandora definitely exceeds the 
Pharmakon, because the box lacks nothing6. It is marked, through every 
transfer, by too much of whatever it contains. 
So far, our argument has sought to follow through the 
implications of the claim that the original, and by extension the mother 
tongue, is incomplete, and is therefore "pleading for translation", and 
speculated what this Derridean claim might mean for Pandora. And we 
6
 Compare Irigaray's point from her essay "When Our Lips Speak Together" in 
This Sex which is not One: "We are not lacks, voids awaiting sustenance, 
plenitude, fulfillment from the other" (1985b, p. 209). 
29 
have seen that for Derrida "[t]he original is not a plenitude" which is why, 
as he puts it in The Ear of the Other, "[t]he original is in the situation of 
demand, that is, of a lack or exile" (1985b, p. 152). In other words, the 
division, or fissure within, is also the lack of integrity and unity from 
which springs the command, or the pleading for translation, the 
incomplete original's yearning for the complement. In this context, let us 
return from Pandora to Babel. 
Babel is a man, or rather a male god, a god that is not full since he is 
full of resentment, jealousy, and so on. He calls out, he desires, he 
lacks, he calls for the complement or the supplement or, as Benjamin 
says, for that which will come along to enrich him. (Derrida 1985b, pp. 
152-153) 
In this description we find another deconstructive manoeuvre, 
and at least on the surface, one which unsettles the Freudian purview of 
woman, ascribing the lack not to woman, but to Babel as the man. What 
are we to make of his lack, what are we to make of this wounded and in 
effect already castrated male god? Is this another tale of mourning? Or, 
more to the point, does this manoeuvre not fall victim to the Irigarayian 
critique, despite itself? For, to say that the father "lacks" is surely to 
remain within the economy of what Irigaray means by hom(me)ology 
(1985a, p. 134). Since patriarchal culture, a culture based on the homme, 
can only function if he is its model, and others are modelled on him, it 
necessarily has to reduce woman to the other of the same (homo/samQ = 
homme/mm); and rather than account for the difference of femininity, her 
sexuality is explained as nothing other than a mutilated copy of his. What 
drives psychoanalytic theory in Irigaray's analysis is, of course, its 
explanation of castration as pertaining to both sexes — to him, that it 
might happen, to her, that it already has. To then pose God the father, 
Ba-bel, as castrated is another way of staying within the very economy of 
presence and/or lack of the phallus, which Freud took as the starting point 
from which to explain both male and female sexuality. Even if the 
presence/lack couplet now comes to be ascribed differently, it is he who 
is lacking, the very orbit of this analysis stays in place: overturned and 
destabilized, it is still within the same economy that presence and absence 
exchange their properties, come to be defined in their non-relation to each 
other. Moreover, we might add with some degree of irony, the distinctive 
lack that delineates the only property of femininity has been 
reappropriated by the male, making her only property (even if it is built 
on lack) his. 
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What Irigaray's thesis illustrates throughout her work, is that she 
conceives of both woman's body and woman's language, not in relation 
to a male other, but as a multiplicity from the outset. Unlike Derrida then, 
she does not therefore follow a deconstructive logic whereby the binary 
opposition between male and female would be exposed, reversed, and 
finally undone, but works with the multiplicity that the phallocentric order 
attempts to reduce, in accordance with the procedure she calls 
"hom(me)ology" to the one and its other (1985a, p. 134). Hence, the 
metaphor of the "two lips". Similarly, I have not approached the question 
of woman in terms of the second sex, nor the question of translation in 
terms of the second text in order to expose, reverse and undo the 
hierarchization operative in the couplet primary and secondary. That is to 
say, rather than unknitting the metaphors which woman and translation 
share, as Lori Chamberlain (1992) does brilliantly, by drawing a link 
between the secondary roles that women and translations have played, and 
subsequently exposing the violence implicit in the hierarchization at work 
in binary oppositions, be it the privileging of primary over secondary, the 
privileging of model over copy, original over translation, man over 
woman — I have sought to get beyond not only the one, but also the two 
which a binary opposition necessarily takes as its premise, in order to 
demonstrate that irreducible multiplicity (in all these contexts) cannot 
logically be dealt with within a reduction to pairs. Accordingly, this has 
consequences for translation insofar as it posits an irreducible seriality of 
versions, as it does for feminist theory, similarly starting from a point of 
excess, rather than lack, as Irigaray proposes. 
Thus, Irigaray's analysis might also be taken into a slightly 
different register, might also be extended to include those theories which 
within feminism demand equality, and within Translation Studies demand 
equivalence. For, those who demand that translation should be equivalent 
to, should be like the original, and those who demand that women should 
be equal, should be like man, nihilate difference in the name of the return 
of the same, in the name of "hom(me)ology". But precisely because 
translation as a process only becomes visible as it becomes serial — after 
all, one translation might be conceived as being merely a mirror to its 
original, exactly as woman, so long as she remains one, is only ever the 
other of man, man's other — precisely because every text can be 
retranslated (and every myth can be rewritten), seriality is a condition 
which neither has a beginning nor an end. What is at stake in the seriality 
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of translation, is not only a rethinking of the assumption that the original's 
richness or plenitude must be matched by its self-same translation, that 
there is one perfect translation for each original; but also, on the other side 
of the spectrum, a thinking beyond a Derridian approach, which in order 
to deconstruct the hierarchy implicit in a couplet such as 
original-translation, must therefore take this binary opposition as its point 
of departure, restrict its orbit of inquiry to the relation between these two; 
and as such also, must leave the lack/plenitude couplet as the horizon, the 
divided whole within which the original and the translation exchange their 
properties. In either case, we are faced with two: the original on the one 
hand, and the translation on the other; the numerical two being evidence 
of a divided one — as we saw with reference to Babel; or the two being 
evidence of a reduction of the many to the one and its other — as we saw 
with reference to Irigaray's critique of hom(me)ology. 
Unlike the God's "double command": "Translate me and what is 
more don't translate me. I desire that you translate me, that you translate 
the name I impose on you; and at the same time, whatever you do, don't 
translate it, you will not be able to translate it" (Derrida 1985b, p. 102), 
a "double bind" from which follows Derrida's thesis that translation is 
both necessary and impossible, and that language is at once translatable 
and untranslatable, Pandora tells a different tale. The many Pandora myths 
lend emphasis not to the impossibility of translation, but the impossibility 
of putting a stop to endless retranslation, in short, show us the serial 
nature of translation: there are always more translations, retranslations. 
This then is not a deconstructive logic of undecidability, which wavers 
between two poles (original-translation), which wavers between two 
meanings of "one" term (pharmakori), but a logic of multiplication. 
Nothing lacks here, nothing gets lost, with each and every translation 
there is always one more. The Pandora myth, which metaphorically links 
the female body and its speech — the mother-tongue — allows us then to 
look back at both Babel and Oedipus, to revise not only the deconstructive 
conception of translation and the psychoanalytic conception of woman, 
but to see with fresh eyes new possibilities for translation and gender. Just 
as Irigaray demonstrates a morphology of woman's body and her speech 
and writing, the lips which are not one, too complex, or several, to be 
reducible to the one, what Pan-dora, her name, exposes is a seriality, not 
just that there never was "one", but that there is always "one" more, and 
so on. To translate her name is therefore not finally to translate her, to 
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translate her at last, to approximate some original condition, but rather to 
translate again, to retranslate. 
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ABSTRACT : Pandora's Tongues — This paper looks at translation not 
from the perspective of Babel, the "male god" as Jacques Derrida and 
George Steiner do, but from the perspective of Pandora, the first woman 
of the Greek creation myth, in order to offer a feminized version of the 
primal scattering of languages. The aim is to pose through the figure of 
Pandora questions about language and woman, and by extension, the 
mother tongue and female sexuality. Whilst the myth of the tower of 
Babel makes visible the filiations of translation and the word of the 
Father, the myth of Pandora allows us to uncover the matrix between 
translation and the mother tongue, presents us, in other words, with new 
possibilities for translation and gender. 
RÉSUMÉ : Les langues de Pandore — L'auteure élabore ici une 
réflexion sur la traduction à partir non pas du mythe de Babel — du « dieu 
masculin » — comme l'ont fait Jacques Derrida et George Steiner dans 
leurs travaux respectifs, mais en reprenant plutôt celui de Pandore, de la 
première femme de l'humanité telle que représentée dans la mythologie 
grecque, afin de proposer une lecture féminisée de la confusion primitive 
des langues. Cette relecture du mythe souhaite revivifier la problématique 
du langage et de la femme; de la langue maternelle et de la sexualité 
féminine. Pour y parvenir, l'auteure propose, à l'instar de l'interprétation 
du mythe de la tour de Babel visant à démontrer les divers liens unissant 
la traduction à la parole du Père, une représentation du mythe de Pandore 
révélant la matrice où s'unissent traduction et langue maternelle, et par où 
s'entrouvrent, par conséquent, de nouvelles voies pour explorer genre et 
traduction. 
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